Moser v. Rosauers Supermarkets, Inc. Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 46004 by unknown
UIdaho Law 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law 
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
9-21-2018 
Moser v. Rosauers Supermarkets, Inc. Respondent's Brief Dckt. 
46004 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs 
Recommended Citation 
"Moser v. Rosauers Supermarkets, Inc. Respondent's Brief Dckt. 46004" (2018). Idaho Supreme Court 
Records & Briefs, All. 7505. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/7505 
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by 





Karel Lehrman, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk




ROSAUERS SUPERMARKETS, INC. , 
Defendant-Respondent. 
) 
) Supreme Court No. 46004 
) 
) 




) ______________ ) 
APPEAL FROM THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
CHAIRMAN THOMAS E. LIMBAUGH PRESIDING 
Michael Thor Kessinger (ISB No. 6719) 
GOICOECHEA LAW OfFICES, LLP 
P.O. Box 287 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-23 J 3 
Facsimile: (208) 743-8140 
Attorney for Appellant 
Alan R. Gardner (ISB No. 2342) 
Michael G. McPeek (ISB No. 2436). 
GARDNER LAW OFFICE 
P.O. Box 2528 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 387-0881 
Facsimile: (208) 387-3501 
Attorney for Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................................................ 1 
(i) Nature of the Case ................................................................................................ ...... 1 
(ii) Course of Proceedings ......................... ...................................................................... . 2 
(iii) Statement of Facts ........ ....................... ........................ ............................................... 3 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL ........................................................... 4 
III. ARGUMENT .................................. ........................................................................................ 5 
A. Claimant's Appeal Must be Dismissed Since Claimant Appeals from an 
Interlocutory Order from which She Does Not Have an Appeal by Right and 
Has Not Obtained Permission to Appeal .................................................................... 5 
B. Statutory Construction does Not Support Claimant's Reading that the Phrase 
'During the Period of Disability' Requires as a Precondition to the Employer 
Obtaining a Medical Examination under Idaho Code Section 72-433 that the 
Employer be Paying Income Benefits at the Time of the Request for the 
Examination and that the Commission Determine that the Employee is In Fact 
Disabled .................................................... .................................... .............................. 7 
C. By Filing a Complaint Seeking an Award of Income Benefits for Temporary 
Disability and Permanent Disability, Claimant Essentially is Asserting that She is 
In the Period of Disability ............................................. ............................................ 13 
V. CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................... 15 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES 
IDAHO CASES 
City of Coeur d'Alene v. Ochs, 96 Idaho 268,526 P.2d 1104 (1974) ......................................... . 5 
Fellech v. Boise Elks Lodge No. 310, 106 Idaho 550, 682 P.2d 91 (1984) ...................... ............ 5 
Gooding County v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 201, 46 P.3d 18 (2002) .. ...... .......... ................. l 1 
Hansen v. State Fann Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 663, 735 P.2d 974 (1987) ....................... 11 
Idaho-Best, Inc. v. First Security Bank, 99 Idaho 517, 519, 584 P.2d 1241, 1244 ( 1978) ........... 5 
Jen-Rath Co. Ille. v. Kit Mfg. Co., 137 Idaho 330, 48 P.3d 659 (2007) ..................................... 11 
Miller v. State, l 19 Idaho 298, 715 P.2d 968 (l 986) .................................. ................................ 12 
Lopez v. State Indus. Special lndem. Fund, 136 Idaho 174, 30 P.3d 952 (2001) ....................... 12 
Robinson v. Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 210, 76 P.3d 951,954 (2003) ........ ................ 11 
Sykes v. C.P. Clare & Co., 100 Idaho 761,764,605 P.2d 939,942 (1980) ... ....... ................. .... 12 
Thompson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 50 P.3d 488 (2002) ........................... ................ l l 
CASES OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
Overstreet v. TRW Commer, Steering Div., 256 S.W. 3d 626 (Tenn. 2008) ............................................ 10 
R.D. Maso11ry, Inc. v. Indus. Comm 'n (Hunter), 215 Ill. 2d 397, 830 N.E. 2d 584 (Ill. 2005) .......... IO, 15 
STATUTES 
Idaho Code §72-102(16) ............................................... .... .................... ....................... ....... ........ 14 
Idaho Code §72-408 .............................................. ....... .... ........................ .......................... .......... 8 
Idaho Code §72-408(1) ............................................................ ............. ............ .......................... 14 
Idaho Code §72-422 .................. ............................ ................................... .................................. 14 
Idaho Code §72-423 ................................................................................................................... 14 
Idaho Code §72-424 ................................................................................................................... 14 
Idaho Code §72-425 .............................................................................................................. ..... 14 
Idaho Code §72-426 ................................................................................ ................................... 14 
Idaho Code §72-427 ............................................................................ ....................................... 14 
Idaho Code §72-428 ................................................................................................................... 14 
Idaho Code §72-430 ......................................................... ................................... ....................... 14 
Idaho Code §72-433 ............................................................... 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16 
Idaho Code §72-434 .............................................................. ................... .............................. 9, 10 
Idaho Code §72-804 ........................................................................................ ............................. 5 
iii 
(i) 
Nature of the Case 
I 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a case in which Appellant's appeal from the Commission's Petition for Declaratory 
Ruling regarding the interpretation of Idaho Code § 72-433 is not properly before the Court 
because (1) Appellant's appeal is from an interim order rather than a final decision and is not 
appealable as a matter of right pursuant to I.A.R. l l(d)(l); (2) Appellant's appeal is not from an 
order deciding compensability that the Industrial Commission determined should be immediately 
appealable pursuant to Rule 12.4 as provided under I.A.R. Rule l l(d)(2); and (3) Appellant did 
not file with the Commission a motion for permission to appeal from an interlocutory order of the 
Commission as required by I.A.R. Rule 12(b). 
Should the Court determine that the appeal is properly before the Court, Respondent 
contends that the reasonable construction of Idaho Code § 72-433 does not support Appellant's 
argument that the statute requires as a precondition to the employer obtaining a medical 
examination on an employee that (1) the employer must actually be paying income benefits to the 
employee for temporary or permanent disability at the time the employer requests the medical 
examination; and (2) that the Commission must first determine that the employee is disabled. 
Respondent further contends that that the requirements of Idaho Code § 72-433 for an 
employer requested have been satisfied because Appellant has asserted that she is in a period of 
disability. That conclusion stems from the fact that Appellant has a pending Workers' 
Compensation Complaint before the Industrial Commission in which she is claiming current 
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entitlement to medical benefits and income benefits for total temporary disability, permanent 
impairment, permanent partial disability, and total permanent disability. 
For relief, Respondent requests that the Court dismiss the appeal as being from a non-
appealable interlocutory order. Alternatively, Respondent requests that the Court affirm the 
Commission, and that it conclude that the requirements of requirements of Idaho Code § 72-433 
have been satisfied. 
(ii) 
Course of Proceedings 
Appellant's recitation of the course of proceedings is incomplete. She failed to mention 
the following pertinent proceedings which occurred prior to the proceedings at which she begins 
her recitation in her Opening Brief of the course of proceedings. 
Claimant filed a Workers' Compensation Complaint on January 5, 2018 regarding her 
accident and injury of October 9, 2016. R., pp. 1-3. In her Complaint, Claimant alleged current 
entitlement not only to medical benefits, but also to income benefits for total temporary disability, 
permanent impairment, pennanent partial disability, and total permanent disability. R., p. l. 
Employer filed its Answer to Complaint on January 10, 2018 R., pp.4-5. Employer denied that 
Claimant was entitled to the benefits she claimed, and Employer denied that the benefits Claimant 
was seeking were causally related to her accident and injury. R., pp. 4-5. On January 17, 2018, 
Employer filed a Notice of Medical Exam indicating it had scheduled an examination pursuant to 
Idaho Code§ 72-433 with Joseph Lynch, M.D., for February 5, 2018. R., pp. 6-7. Then on January 
24, 2018, Employer filed a Motion for Sanctions after Claimant, through her attorney, indicated 
she would not attend the medical examination scheduled for February 5, 2019. R., pp. 8-16. 
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Claimant also failed to mention other pertinent proceedings. The Commission's Referee 
on February 7, 2018 issued his Order on Defendants' Motion for Sanctions and Claimant's Motion 
for Protective Order. R., pp. 59-61. The Referee denied Claimant's Motion for Protective Order 
and granted Employer's Motion for Sanctions to the extent it sought an order from the Commission 
requiring attendance by Claimant at a medical examination on a date mutually available to 
Claimant and to either Dr. Joseph Lynch or Dr. Thomas Goodwin. R., p.60. Claimant neither filed 
a petition for reconsideration of the Referee's Order nor sought to appeal from that Order. 
Employer t on February 7, 2018 filed a Second Notice of Medical Exam, scheduling a medical 
examination with Dr. Joseph Lynch for April 2, 2018. On March 23, 2013, Employer filed a Notice 
of Cancellation of Medical Examination regarding April 2, 2018 examination. Employer has not 
made further attempts to schedule a medical examination of Claimant pursuant to Idaho Code § 
72-433. 
(iii) 
Statement of Facts 
Besides the facts stated by Claimant, Employer would also state that the Employer arranged 
for Michael Ludwig, M.D., to evaluate Claimant on September 7, 2017. R., p. 93. Dr. Ludwig 
noted that Claimant had a well-documented history of right shoulder dislocation pre-dating the 
October 9, 2016 accident. He opined that, at most, the accident aggravated her pre-existing 
condition, but that she had returned to her pre-injury baseline by the time of his examination. Id. 
He did not believe she required any further medical care as the causal result of the accident. Id. 
Dr. Ludwig concluded that she had a permanent impairment of 11 % of the upper extremity 
regarding her right shoulder condition, but that all of the impairment was attributable to the pre-
existing condition and none to the industrial accident. Id. He gave her certain permanent 
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restrictions to protect her right shoulder, but he felt those restrictions were also entirely related to 
the pre-existing condition. Id. On September 28, 2017, the claims examiner for the Employer 
issued a Notice of Claim Status in which she informed Claimant that 
Dr. Ludwig has opined you are at maximum medical improvement without further 
medical treatment needed as of 9/7 / 17. He awarded you an 11 % upper extremity 
permanent partial disability rating with 100% apportioned to your pre-existing 
condition and 0% related to your industrial incident. 
R., p. 46. On December 13, 2017, Adam Jelinek, M.D., a treating physician of Claimant's indicated 
that he would recommend a referral of Claimant to Dr. Joseph Lynch or Dr. Thomas Goodwin. R., 
p. 10. Claimant on January 5, 2015, filed a Workers' Compensation Complaint seeking medical 
benefits, and income benefits for total temporary disability, permanent partial disability, and total 
permanent disability. R., pp. 1-3. Subsequent to Employer's filing of its Answer to Complaint on 
January 10, 2018, Employer on January 17, 2011 filed a Notice of Medical Exam for an 
examination by Dr. Lynch on February 5, 2018. R., pp. 4-7. Claimant refused to attend the 
examination. R., p. 12. 
II 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Is the Order from which Claimant appeals an interlocutory order and not a final order 
or decision? 
2. Must Claimant's appeal be dismissed because Claimant does not have an appeal by 
right and because Claimant did not seek permission to appeal? 
3. Do the claims for income benefits for temporary disability and permanent disability 
which Claimant raises in her pending Workers' Compensation Complaint constitute 
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an assertion by Claimant that she is in a period of disability, thereby satisfying the 
requirements of Idaho Code § 72-433 for an employer requested medical examination? 
III 
ARGUMENT 
A. CLAIMANT'S APPEAL MUST BE DISMISSED SINCE CLAIMANT APPEALS 
FROM AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER FROM wmcH SHE DOES NOT HA VE AN 
APPEAL BY RIGHT AND HAS NOT OBTAINED PERMISSION TO APPEAL 
Rule ll(d)(l), I.A.R., permits "[a]n appeal as a matter of right" to the Idaho Supreme 
Court: "(1) [t]rom any final decision or order of the Industrial Commission or from any final 
decision or order upon rehearing or reconsideration by the administrative agency." The Court has 
determined that a "final decision or order" for purposes of an appeal by right is one that finally 
determines the rights of the parties and ends the litigation. Fenech v. Boise Elks Lodge No. 310, 
106 Idaho 550,682 P. 2d 91 (1984), citing with approval City oJCoeurd'Ale11e v. Ochs, 96 Idaho 
268,526 P. 2d 1104 (1974); and Idaho-Best, Inc. v. First Security Bank, 99 Idaho 517,519,584 P. 
2d 1241, 1244 (1978). 
Claimant's Workers' Compensation Complaint seeks medical benefits and income benefits 
for total temporary ~isability, permanent impairment, permanent partial disability, total permanent 
disability. The Complaint also alleges entitlement to retraining benefits and seeks an award of 
attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-804. Those issues have not been adjudicated by the 
Commission, no hearing has been requested by Claimant or scheduled by the Commission 
regarding those issues, the Complaint has not been withdrawn, and the Complaint remains 
pending. The Commission's Order on Petition for Declaratory Ruling does not adjudicate any of 
the issues raised in the pending Complaint. Because the Complaint and the issues raised in it 
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remain pending, the Order Claimant has appealed from is not a final order because it does not 
finally determine the rights of the parties and end the litigation regarding the Complaint. Thus, the 
Order on Petition for Declaratory Ruling is an interlocutory order which is not appealable as a 
matter of right pursuant to Rule 11 ( d)( 1 ). 
There are two ways in which an interlocutory order can be appealed under the Idaho 
Appellate Rules, but neither rule applies in the instant case. 
I.A.R. Rule l l(d)(2) provides for an appeal "[f]rom any order of the Industrial Commission 
deciding compensability that the Commission has determined should be immediately appealable 
pursuant to Rule 12.4. The order from which Claimant appeals did not decide compensability. 
Consequently, Rule 1 l(d)(2) does not apply. 
I.A.R. Rule 12(a) provides that 
Permission may be granted by the Idaho Supreme Court to appeal from an 
interlocutory order or judgment of a district court in a civil or criminal action, or 
from an interlocutory order of an administrative agency, which is not otherwise 
appealable under these rules, but which involves a controlling question of law as to 
which there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion and in which an 
immediate appeal from the order or decree may materially advance the orderly 
resolution of the litigation. 
R~le 12 establishes a two-step process for obtaining permi~sion to appeal. First, Rule 12(b) 
requires that a motion for permission to appeal be filed with the administrative agency within 
fourteen ( 14) days from the date of entry of the order or judgment from which permission to appeal 
is sought. Second, Rule 12(c)(l) requires that a motion for permission to appeal be filed with the 
Court within fourteen (14) days from the administrative agency's "order approving or 
disapproving a motion for permission to appeal[.]" 
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Claimant did not file with the Commission a motion for permission to appeal from the 
Order on Petition for Declaratory Ruling. Consequently, Claimant did not comply with the Court's 
rules for appeal by permission of an interlocutory order. 
For the above reasons, Claimant's appeal is not properly before the Court and must be 
dismissed. 
B. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION DOES NOT SUPPORT CLAIMANT'S READING 
THAT THE PHRASE 'DURING THE PERIOD OF DISABILITY' REQUIRES AS A 
PRECONDITION TO THE EMPLOYER OBTAINING A MEDICAL EXAMINATION 
UNDER IDAHO CODE§ 72-433 THAT THE EMPLOYER BE PAYING INCOME 
BENEFITS AT THE TIME OF THE REQUEST FOR THE EXAMINATION AND THAT 
THE COMMISSION DETERMINE THAT THE EMPLOYEE IS IN FACT DISABLED 
If the Court determines the Claimant's appeal is properly before it, the merits of Claimant's 
appeal must be addressed. Claimant's argument on appeal boils down to this: because Idaho Code 
§ 72-433 uses the phrase ''during the period of disability," that means the employer must be paying 
income benefits to the employee at the time the employer requests the medical examination before 
the employer has the statutory right to request the examination and before the Commission can 
order the examination. Appellant's Opening Brief, Section IV, p. IO. As Claimant phrases it, .. If 
an injured worker is not receiving income benefits, neither the employer nor the Commission have 
statutory authority to compel an insurance medical examination." Id. In view of her statutory 
interpretation, Claimant contends that she was justified in refusing to attend the § 72-433 medical 
examination that Defendants scheduled for February 5, 2018 on the following grounds: (1) the 
Defendants on September 7, 2017 had Claimant attend a § 72-433 examination in which the 
examining physician had "opined that Claimant had reached maximal medical improvement and 
did not require addition medical care as a result of the subject work injury"; (2) the Defendants 
subsequently issued a Notice of Claims Status on September 27, 2017, "stating Claimant would 
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not be receiving additional benefits;" and (3) because of the foregoing events in September 2017, 
the Defendants, when they scheduled the February 5, 2018 § 72-433 examination, "had already 
concluded that Claimant was not within her period of and terminated benefits[.]" Appellant's 
Opening Brief, Statement of Facts, pp. 1-2. As noted in the Commission's Order on Petition for 
Declaratory Ruling filed on April 4, 2008, Claimant initially argued 
that the term period of disability is the equivalent of "period of recovery," as use in 
Idaho Code§ 72-408. Therefore, Claimant argues that it must be demonstrated that 
Claimant is in a "period of recovery" and has not reached medical stability before 
she may be ordered to attend and Idaho Code § 72-433 exam. 
R., pp. 92-104 at 96. Claimant then expanded her statutory interpretation argument beyond solely 
temporary disability. 
Id. 
In her reply brief, Claimant acknowledges that the term "period of disability" 
encompasses not only periods of temporary disability, but periods of permanent 
disability as well. However, she continues to take the position that it is only during 
periods in which Claimant is receiving either temporary or permanent disability 
benefits that she can be required to attend an Idaho Code § 72-433 exam. If 
Claimant is not receiving disability benefits at the time of an Idaho Code § 72-433 
exam, Claimant argues that fore such exam can take place, the Commission must 
find that Claimant is entitled to disability. 
The Commission summarized as follows the glaring problem with the interpretation of the 
phrase "period of disability" argued for by Claimant: 
At the end of the day, the reading of the statute urged by Claimant is 
altogether nonsensical and would deny employers the opportunity to investigate the 
fundamental components of a Claimant's entitlement to benefits until Claimant is 
found entitled to these benefits by the Commission. Only after there has been 
judicial confirmation that an injury or occupational disease occurred and that 
Claimant is entitled to temporary/permanent disability would Employer be allowed 
to undertake a medical evaluation intended to help it defend the Claim, at which 
time such an undertaking would be pointless. Such a construction would hamstring 
any defense to a claim for benefits, perhaps impermissibly, since it seems 
tantamount to a denial of due process or equal protection. 
We recognize that abuse ofldaho Code§ 72-433 exams occur from time to 
time, and if they do, such issues can be addressed by the Referee, as they were in 
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this case. However, it cannot have been the intention of the legislature to require 
that the question of whether Claimant has suffered an "injury" or "occupational 
disease," or is temporarily or permanently disabled, be adjudicated before 
Defendants are allowed to conduct the examination(s) that they feel are necessary 
to defend exactly those claims. Such a strange interpretation of the statue would 
yield an indefensible result. Employers must have timely access to an injured 
worker in order to promptly investigate a claim, and to defend cases in litigation. 
Order on Petition for Declaratory Ruling filed April 4, 2018, R., pp. 92-104 at 102-103. 
In leading up to its summarization, the Commission brought up several points. Among 
these, it noted that there frequently are instances in which a medical examination is desired where 
the Commission has made not determination "that claimant has a compensable condition, much 
less an entitlement to medical care and temporary/permanent disability." It also noted that the 
instant case 
R., 99. 
perfectly illustrates the problem. Notwithstanding that the Defendants have 
accepted the subject claim, a dispute exists over the extent and degree to which 
Claimant's ongoing problems are causally related to the subject accident. Thee has 
been no Commission determination as to whether or not Claimant's need for future 
care is related to the accident. There has been no Commission determinations as to 
whether or not Claimant is medically stable, and if so, whether she is entitled to 
disability. There has been no Commission determination as to whether or not 
Claimant, if in a period of temporary disability, is temporarily disabled because of 
the work accident. Indeed, one of the objectives of Idaho Code § 72-433 is to allow 
Employer the opportunity to obtain medical opinions necessary to investigate 
defenses to a claim and to assist the Commission in sorting out these issues. To say 
that the Commission must first make a determination on the question of whether 
Claimant is in a period of .temporary or permanent disability before Defendants are 
entitled to require Claimant's attendance at an Idaho Code §72-433 exam puts the 
cart before the horse and would make Idaho Code § 72-433 exams largely pointless. 
The Commission also pointed out that if it adopted Claimant's interpretation ofldaho Code 
§ 72-433, it would create a conflict between that statute and Idaho Code § 72-434, which specifies 
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that an injured worker who unreasonably refuses to submit to an Idaho Code§ 72-
433 exam shall suffer the suspense of her right to "prosecute any proceedings under 
this law." Claimant argues that until it is determined by the finder of fact that an 
injury produce by an accident has occurred and Claimant has suffered 
temporary/permanent disability as a result, no right to an Idaho Code § 72-433 
exam exists. In other words, after Claimant proves her case, Defendants may ask 
Claimant to submit to an exam. This is inconsistent, and in conflict, with the 
provisions of Idaho Code § 72-434, which clearly anticipates that exams may take 
place before a hearing on the merits, or similar determination, takes place. 
Otherwise, there would be no point to the penalty of suspending Claimant's right 
to prosecute her claim. 
R., p. 100. 
The Tennessee Supreme Court faced an argument similar to that of Claimant in the instant 
case that an employer's denial of entitlement to income benefits precludes its statutory right to a 
medical examination. Overstreet v. TRW Commer, Steering Div., 256 S.W.3d 626 (Tenn. 2008). 
The Court rejected Overstreet's argument, reasoning that 
By contesting liability, an employer does not forfeit the entitlement to 
compel the employee to submit to an examination conducted by a physician of the 
employer's choosing. Id. When causation is in dispute, standards of fairness lend 
themselves to the notion that the employer should have the benefit of an expert who 
has had the opportunity to examine the employee's alleged injury. See Thomas v. 
Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 812 S.W. 2d278, 283 (Tenn. 1991) ("Medical causation and 
permanency of an injury must be established in most cases by expert medical 
testimony."). This is especially true when, under the terms of our Act, any 
reasonable doubt as to the cause of an injury will be construed in favor of the 
employee. See, e.g., White v. Werthan Indus., 824 S.W.2d 158, 159 (Tenn. 1992); 
Williams v. Preferred Dev.Corp.,224 Tenns. 174, 452 S.W. 2d 344, 345 (Tenn. 
1970). For these reasons, we hold that the trial court erred by denying TRW's 
request to conduct a medical evaluation. 
256 S.W.3d at 638. 
As has Claimant in the instant case, the employee in R.D. Masonry, Inc. v. Indus. Comm 'n 
(Hunter), 215 111. 2d 397, 830 N.E.2d 584 (111. 2005), argued that the Illinois statute regarding 
employer medical examinations precluded the right to an examination unless the employer was 
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paying income benefits at the time the examination was requested. The employer was contesting 
the employee's entitlement to additional temporary total disability benefits. The examination 
statute provided, in pertinent part, that "An employee entitled to receive disability payments shall 
be required, if requested by the employer, to submit himself ... for examination to a duly qualified 
medical practitioner or surgeon selected by the employer . . .. " 215 Ill. 2d at 403,830 N.E.2d at 
589. The employee argued that the phrase "entitled to receive disability payments" required the 
actual making of payments. The Court held that the language of the statute did not limit the right 
to an examination to cases in which the employer acknowledged liability to make income benefits 
payments, since to hold otherwise would mean that an employer could never effectively contest a 
claim. 215 Ill. 2d at 405-8, 830 N.E.2d at 590-2. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has never construed the phrase "during the period of disability" 
for purposes of an Idaho Code § 72-433 examination. The interpretation of a statute is a question 
of law over which the Court exercises free review. Gooding County v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 
201, 46 P.3d 18 (2002). Interpretation begins with the literal language of the statute. Thompson v. 
City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 50 P.3d 488 (2002). Those words are to be given their plain, 
usual, and ordinary meaning. Robinson v. Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 210, 76 P.3d 951, 
954 (2003). But the Court must apply any pertinent statutory definitions and must read the 
provision in context of the workers' compensation law as a whole. Id., 137 Idaho at 212, 76 P.3d 
at 956. If doing so reveals that the statute is not ambiguous, then the Court applies the statute as 
written and does not consult extrinsic evidence to determine legislative intent. Hansen v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 663, 735 P.2d 974 (1987). A statute is ambiguous, however, 
where the language is capable of more than one reasonable construction. Jen-Rath Co. Inc. v. Kit 
Mfg. Co., 137 Idaho 330, 48 P.3d 659 (2007). If the statute is ambiguous, then it must be construed 
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to mean what the legislature intended it to mean. Miller v. State, 119 Idaho 298, 715 P.2d 968 
( 1986). Factors which the Court will then examine to determine legislative intent include the 
reasonableness of the proposed construction and the public policy behind the statute. Lopez v. State 
Indus. Special Indenz. Fund, 136 Idaho 174, 30 P. 3d 952 (2001). 
There is nothing in the language of the statute and the various provisions regarding income 
benefits and disability which addresses how Idaho Code § 72-433 should be applied where an 
employee has filed a Complaint alleging entitlement to income benefits for temporary disability 
and permanent disability but the employer has contested its liability for the benefits claimed and 
is not paying income benefits of any kind at the time the employer request the medical 
examination. Nor is there any language in the statute requiring that the Commission make a 
determination of disability as a precondition to the employer's right to a medical examination of 
the employee. The Court thus has to determine a reasonable construction of the statute. As the 
Commission observed, to interpret the statute as argued for by Claimant would make Idaho Code 
§ 72-433 "pointless." Moreover, it would also turn on its head basic concepts of law regarding an 
employee's obligations regarding establishment of a compensable disability. As the Court 
articulated in Sykes v. C.P. Clare & Co., 100 Idaho 761, 764, 605 P.2d 939, 942, (1980), 
This Court has held on numerous occasions that, in workmen's compensation cases 
there must be medical testimony supporting the claim for compensation with a 
reasonable degree of medical probability. Bowman v. Twin Falls Const. Co., Inc., 
99 Idaho 312,581 P.2d 770 (1978); Fisher v. Bunker Hill Co., 96 Idaho 341,528 
P.2d 903 (1974). Workmen's compensation cases, because of their medical aspects, 
depend upon knowledge neither expected nor possessed by lay witnesses, and the 
basis for any award must rest upon and be supported by medical testimony. Comish 
v. J. R. Simplot Fertilizer Co., 86 Idaho 79,383 P.2d 333 (1963). 
Not only must the award be based upon medical testimony but it is a well-
established principle of law that in workmen's compensation cases, the claimant 
has the burden of proving a compensable disablement in order to recover. Wilson 
v. Carl Gilb, Inc., supra; Kem v. Shark, 94 Idaho 69, 480 P.2d 915 (1971); 
Davenport v. Big Tom Breeder Famis, Inc., 85 Idaho 604, 382 P.2d 762 (1963). 
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The record here indicates that Sykes called no other witnesses to testify besides 
himself and no medical opinion testimony was introduced which established his 
disability and subsequent eligibility to receive total temporary disability payments 
after November 6, 1973. 
Furthermore, where the employer or its surety has paid total temporary disability 
payments and then terminates such payments, as in this case, this Court has held 
that payments of such compensation prior to termination do not constitute an 
admission that the employee's subsequent condition was due to a compensable 
cause which required the employer or surety to prove cessation of the compensable 
disability. Carlson v. F. H. DeAtley & Co., 55 Idaho 713, 46 P.2d 1089 (1935). The 
burden of proof thus remains on the claimant, even where the employer or its surety 
originally paid disability compensation to the employee. 
Thus, for the above reasons, the Court should affirm the Commission. 
C. BY FILING A COMPLAINT SEEKING AN A WARD OF INCOME BENEFITS FOR 
TEMPORARY DISABILITY AND PERMANENT DISABILITY, CLAIMANT 
ESSENTIALLY IS ASSERTING THAT SHE IS IN THE PERIOD OF DISABILITY 
Curiously, Claimant mentions nothing in her Appellant's Opening Brief regarding the 
Workers' Compensation Complaint she filed with the Commission on January 5, 2018. R., pp. 1-
3. The Complaint, however, needs to be reviewed to understand the scope of the workers' 
compensation benefits being sought by Claimant. The Commission's Complaint Form asks for a 
description of the "NATURE OF THE MEDICALS PROBLEMS ALLEGED AS A RESULT OF 
ACCIDENT OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE." R., p. 1. In response, Claimant indicated that 
the medical problem was a "Right shoulder dislocation. R., p. 1. The Complaint Form then asks 
"WHAT WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS ARE YOU CLAIMING AT THIS TIME? 
To that question, Claimant responded "See issues below[,]" and in the section of the Complaint 
Form for "ISSUE OR ISSUES INVOLVED" Claimant listed the following: 
1. Entitlement to medical care; 
2. Entitlement to temporary total disability; 
3. Extent of permanent impairment; 
4. Entitlement to permanent disability; 
5. Entitlement to total permanent disability including total disability pursuant to the 
odd-lot doctrine; 
13 
6. Entitlement to retraining; [and] 
7. Entitlement to attorney fees for unreasonable denial of benefits. 
R., p. l. In its Answer to Complaint, Employer admitted the occurrence of Claimant's accident; 
but denied "all allegations of the Complaint not admitted herein[,]" and denied that "the condition 
for which Claimant seeks benefits is related to any work accident, injury, or occupational disease." 
R., pp. 4-5. The Agency's Record does not reflect that a Hearing has been held or scheduled on 
the substantive issues raised in the Workers' Compensation Complaint and the Answer to 
Complaint. R., pp. 1-120. Those issues remaining pending. 
Thus, at the time Employer filed its Notice of Medical Action, Motion for Sanctions, and 
Second Notice of Medical Exam, which, respectively, were filed on January 17, January 24, and 
February 7, 2018, R., pp. 6-16, 62-63, Employer was dealing with a situation in which Claimant 
had, among other claims, alleged in her Complaint the current entitlement to temporary total 
disability benefits, permanent partial disability benefits, and total permanent disability benefits. 
Temporary total disability benefits are "income benefits" payable for total disability 
"during the period of recovery." Idaho Code§ 72-408. The recovery period ends when the injured 
worker reaches "maximum medical rehabilitation[,]. Idaho Code §72-422. Further "income 
benefits" are payable for permanent partial disability based upon evaluation of permanent 
impairment and permanent disability in excess of impairment. Idaho Code §72-422, §72-423, § 
72-424, § 72-425, § 72-426, §72-427, §72-428, §72-429, and §72-430. If the nature and extent of 
permanent disability following maxim medical rehabilitation is, however, total rather than partial, 
then income benefits are payable at the total temporary disability rate for as long as the employee 
is totally and permanently disabled. Idaho Code§ 72-408(1). "Income benefits" are defined by 
Idaho Code § 72-102(16) as "payments provided for or made under the provisions of this law to 
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the injured employee disabled by an injury or occupational disease, or his depending in case of 
death, excluding medical and related benefits." 
By claiming entitlement to temporary total disability benefits, permanent partial disability 
benefits, and total permanent disability benefits, Claimant necessarily was alleging that she was in 
a "period of disability." Claimant cannot legitimately allege that she is entitled to income benefits 
for "disability" and at the same time allege that the employer must prove that she is "disabled" 
and, thus, in a "period of disability" in order to obtain a medical examination pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 72-433. The Illinois Supreme Court pointed out the absurdity of that type of reasoning in 
R.D. Masonry, Inc. v. Indus. Comm ',z (Hunter), supra, when it observed that 
Claimant argues that because Masonry denied liability from the outset, it 
should be prevented from asserting that he was an employee entitled to receive 
benefits for purposes of section 12. Claimant's argument, of course, ignores that 
by filing an adjustment of claim with the arbitrator for his injury, claimant asserted 
from the outset that he was an employee entitled to compensation payments. 
215 Ill. at 406,830 N.E.2d at 591. 
Therefore, the Court should conclude that a claim for income benefits for disability 
constitutes an assertion that the employee is in a period of disability and, therefore, is legally 




The Order from which Claimant appeals is an interlocutory order and not a final order or 
decision because it did not determine the rights of the parties regarding the substantive issues raised 
in the pending Complaint and did not end the litigation between the parties. Claimant does not 
have an appeal by right from the Order pursuant to I.A.R. Rule 1 l(d)(l) or Rule l l(d)(2). Claimant 
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did not comply with the Court's rules for obtaining permission to appeal from an interlocutory 
under I.A.R. Rule 12 since Claimant did not file with the Commission a motion for permission to 
appeal as required by I.A.R. Rule 12(b). For the foregoing reasons, Claimant's appeal must be 
dismissed. 
Statutory construction does not support Claimant's argument on the merits that the phrase 
"during the period of disability" requires as a precondition to the Employer obtaining a medical 
examination under Idaho Code§ 72-433 that the Employer be paying income benefits at the time 
of the request for the examination and that the Commission determine that Claimant is in fact 
disabled. Consequently, the Court should affirm the Commission. 
Claimant in her Worker's Compensation Complaint, which remains pending, alleges 
entitlement to an award of income benefits for total temporary disability and for permanent 
disability. These claims essentially are an assertion by Claimant that she is in a period of disability. 
As such, the conditions for obtaining a medical examination of Claimant under Idaho Code § 72-
433 have been satisfied. 
Dated this 2151 day of September, 2018. 
GARDNER LAW OFFICE 
~~~ 
Attorney for Respondent 
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